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## THE ORIGIN OF NIETZSCHE'S PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION.

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**T**HROUGHOUT Nietzsche's writings three recurrent notes continually appear. The first is the lack of strong individualities; the second is the question of disinterested conduct; and the third is the subject of pessimism. These three factors sum up for Nietzsche the characteristics of his own time; and they form the burden of his philosophy. He wants to get rid of each of them; though, in the end, they are all reducible to the one problem of individuality. The solution he seeks is an objective one: no thinker is more alive to the necessity of an objective solution than Nietzsche.<sup>1</sup> But this is not obtained by appealing to any fact of consciousness, for that is to have recourse to a merely subjective feeling of worth, as is the case, for example, when conscience is taken as guide. It is to be obtained by a reference to the tendencies of life and the processes of nature, observable in the world around us.

### I.

Nietzsche was at first an enthusiastic, though not a wholly uncritical, disciple of Schopenhauer, with whose writings he gained acquaintance, both by reading and lectures, during his earlier student-days at Leipzig. But he later became an ardent opponent of Schopenhauer. The ground of this almost complete change of attitude may be found, in part, in a certain strain of individualism in his temperament; probably, in part, too, in the state of his own health, as he himself says. "I made my philosophy," he remarks, "out of my will to health, to life. The years of my lowest vitality were the years when I ceased to be a

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<sup>1</sup> *Vid. e. g., Will to Power: 707.*

pessimist." These personal factors, however, need not be regarded as wholly explanatory of the change. The explanation is to be sought in the historical conditions of the time, through the influence of which whatever individualistic element was inherent in Nietzsche came to assume a definite theoretical character and to emerge as a metaphysical tenet.

Nietzsche's disagreement with Schopenhauer first began after 1870 and gradually gained a definite form in the following years, manifesting itself at length in a complete breach with Wagner, who was throughout a staunch admirer of Schopenhauer, and then finally in a vigorous attack upon his former master. The conditions arising in Germany after 1870 were what roused Nietzsche to active criticism and resolute constructive effort. He noted after the victorious wars against Denmark, Austria, and particularly France, a new spirit emerging in Germany; and in its smugness, selfishness, self-glorification, repulsive nationalism, and national greed it showed itself a spirit that was far away from that of the world of Goethe. He was struck, too, by the growing sterility of the period in really great men. Nowhere could there be found a man who had set his seal upon the age by establishing new ideals. Wagner appeared to him for a time as the Messiah; but with the production of *Parsifal* the hope was destroyed, for it revealed Wagner to be completely subject to the influences of the time, *Parsifal* being merely Schopenhauer's doctrine of the saint, and Schopenhauer himself being but a reproduction of Christianity. Nietzsche saw among his fellow-countrymen a growing servility, imitativeness and uniformity of character, an increasing loss of the sense of proportion between the small and the great, and the gradual disappearance of any desire to accept individual responsibility or a readiness to stand alone against the crowd for the sake of new values. The individual, losing himself in the mass, had come to live without responsibility, and to live thus had come to mean living with freedom.

Nietzsche ascribes this change in German character to the prevailing system of values, and to the presence of a powerful public opinion, which secured the observance of the accepted standards, and against which none except very strong natures dared rise up. But the power of this public opinion and such a system of values are established by education; and hence Nietzsche regards the German educational system as, in the first instance, the source of danger. His criticism of it is set forth in the essays on "David Strauss" and (more particularly) on "Schopenhauer as educator." The system, according to him, refused to assign any independent worth to the individual, and it aimed at inculcating standards of self-sacrifice, at exalting the whole or the state at the expense of the individual, and at producing thereby men serviceable to the state in the form of machines. The prevailing study of history, which he attacks in his essay on "the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life," was steadily creating a weight of tradition which magnified the state but oppressed individuality. Religion, also, like morality, was made subservient to the same purpose: it had become a mere artifice with the ruling class; this, it may be added, being the reason of the hostility to the church on the part of Socialism in Germany, and also of Nietzsche's inclusion of morality and Christianity in one sweeping condemnation. That the whole system was generally believed to be effective, was shown by the common remark that the war against France had been won by the Prussian schoolmaster.

Nietzsche, from a study of history, held that all growth and progress took place, and could alone take place, through the individual, and that every advance necessitated opposition to the accepted values and that body of tradition consolidated in the state. Anything, accordingly, that thrust the individual into a secondary position and that prevented him from developing his life to its proper fulness, was to be attacked. A system that trained the individual to be only an instrument and that had regard to his welfare only in so far as it was necessary to make him an efficient instrument,

was hostile to true education. The latter meant to Nietzsche a fine adjustment of all impulses and instincts in one rich, harmonious individuality, a development of individual initiative, of a sense of self-responsibility, of a readiness to be answerable for one's self and to stand by one's self. This is what Nietzsche calls culture; it is also what he means by "living dangerously"; and he opposes it to civilisation, which was the system of life then prevalent, and which meant the dominance of the state, the maiming of individuality, the placing of the end in the crowd, the sway of standards of altruism and self-sacrifice. He regarded culture and the state as antagonistic, and held that there was a standard of value other than the state, and decisive even against altruism and sacrifice.

Nietzsche, however, finds behind the established system of education a more ultimate cause of the disregard of the claims of the individual, and of the consequent deterioration of the German character. Education itself is based upon definite theories; and these must be held to be the ultimate cause. Nietzsche regards that secondary position, assigned to individuality in practice in his own time, as the outcome of a tendency running throughout the whole history of philosophy. The tendency is to accept concepts or ideas as the standard by which to measure life, to trust notions just as much as the senses are mistrusted; and its culminating point is attained according to Nietzsche in the philosophy of Schopenhauer.

The essence of Schopenhauer's teaching is a hostility to individuality. According to it, the highest form of knowledge is a pure objective intuition of the Ideas, an attitude which transcends the limits of space and time, and in which all sense of individuality is lost. The restless, ceaseless, and purposeless activity of the world-will is a process in which the individual is but a mere puppet in the hands of Nature for the maintenance of the species or the preservation of the eternal Ideas. When we view Nature objectively, says Schopenhauer, "we find she has but one purpose—that of the conservation of every species.

Toward this end she works through the enormous surplus of seed, through the excessive violence of the sex-impulse." "For Nature the individual has only an indirect value, namely, only in so far as it is a means for preserving the species. Beyond this is its existence indifferent to her." And, again, "she is ever ready to sacrifice the individual, not only in a thousand-fold way through the most insignificant incidents but also in a fundamental and predetermined manner from the moment when it has served the purpose of continuing the species." To attempt to find why Nature should seek to conserve the species is vain: it simply seems as if "she strove to lose none of the Ideas or permanent forms which with so much labour she has brought into being." In morality, again, the only principle of true ethical value is that of sympathy, total disinterestedness, pure altruism where every egoistic element, or every reference to one's own individuality is eliminated; and the highest ideal is the saint, who crushes, and refuses to satisfy, all the impulses which give content to the individual life.

This philosophy of Schopenhauer found a ready acceptance in the generation preceding Nietzsche's own philosophical activity. "Through four generations almost," says A. H. Braasch in *Die religiösen Strömungen der Gegenwart*, "he remained the most popular philosopher, and he was able to bask for a generation in the splendour of his fame. After the disappointment of the hopes of 1848, under the weight of the reaction an embittered mood prevailed. This mood rediscovered itself in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Likewise the religious decay of the people in the fifties found its justification before it particularly in the 'Parerga and Paralipomena' with its bitter scorn. And all unrecognized genius, all sceptical and depressed spirits, all pessimistic hearts eagerly snatched at the poisoned sweetmeat offered them in the 'Parerga and Paralipomena.'" The oppressive spirit of reaction on the part of the victorious rulers who sought "to wipe out of the German constitution the democratic blot of that year

of shame" (1848) denied scope for free activity in religion, in thought, in political and social effort to the strong, healthy impulses of the youth of that period; and in so far as they refused to be quiescent under the Schopenhauerian doctrine of the nothingness of individuality, they sought an outlet in the sensuous life of beer-drinking and in the enjoyment of drinking-songs.

The substance of Nietzsche's argument is that individuality, in practical life, began to be crushed under the influence of definite views or theories, and that the tendency thus set in motion is carried out to its final issue through the acceptance of Schopenhauer's principles. The problem for Nietzsche becomes one of the liberation of the individual or the restoration of individuality both theoretically and practically. The questions of pessimism and disinterestedness are both involved in this problem. The failure to give due recognition to the nature of individuality and to the differences between individuals led, in Schopenhauer, to a completely abstract doctrine of equality between individuals, and to a consequent doctrine of total disinterestedness; but, reintroducing once more the claims of individuality, in an indirect manner, in the disguised form of a hedonistic standard, without, however, a critical examination of the relation of pleasure to the life of the individual, Schopenhauer is consistently driven to deny even the ultimate value of pure altruism and to formulate a pessimistic view of life.

Partly because Nietzsche regards Schopenhauer as the culminating point of the tendency throughout all philosophy, partly because Schopenhauer's philosophy was dominant at the moment, and partly because he is most concerned with it on account of his early adherence to it, his opposition to the trend of German life in his time becomes mainly an opposition to Schopenhauer. His philosophy is intelligible only in the light of this fact. His terms like philosophers, metaphysicians, psychologists, which he uses in a vague and general way, are aimed mainly at Schopenhauer. He calls his theory an 'immoralism'

because he insists upon the element of egoism (or, more properly, individuality) which Schopenhauer had characterized as 'immoral' and because he denies the implication of the accepted morality, confirmed by Schopenhauer, that moral values belong to the constitution of the world, are imperishable and must simply be submitted to. His so-called 'hardness' and a little of his 'brutality' are to be understood in reference to Schopenhauer's indiscriminating principle of sympathy, which exalts the heart at the expense of the head. And his attitude as Antichrist is intelligible in relation to Schopenhauer's statement in 'Parerga and Paralipomena' (Band II. § 110): "To deny that the world has a moral significance is a perversity of spirit, coincident with what is called in religion by the name of Antichrist." Nietzsche just strenuously does maintain this denial and hence he is Antichrist.

## II.

The nineteenth century may be regarded as in a special degree the biological period. The first half witnessed practically the foundation of the science of Embryology in the researches of the eminent Russian naturalist, Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876); and by the middle of the century the empirical method of investigation had succeeded in establishing itself in the region of organic life, which had hitherto been stubbornly maintained to be the sphere of the divine and the miraculous. The successful results achieved by the empirical study of organic life tended to expel gradually the notion of a divine power in Nature or the idea of a special creation by Providence, in spite of the opposition which this tendency called forth both from the church and from the steadily diminishing number of orthodox naturalists. The idea of evolution which had occurred to thinkers like Leibniz, Herder, Schelling, Hegel, but which was employed more as an *a priori* principle in their philosophies than as an actual fact requiring explanation, was gradually absorbed by biology and placed on an empirical basis. At first it remained



badly formulated and badly substantiated; but, through the widening of the field of inquiry and through the consequent accumulation of facts, it came to assume a more definite form. When Embryology showed that the individual life underwent a progressive development from the minutest cell to its adult state, evolution was seen to be at least something actual. Observed facts also tended to support the assumption that organic life as a whole had undergone a progressive development. The main difficulty, however, which remained was not the question as to the fact of a progressive development, for this had come to be generally accepted by biologists, but the question as to the nature of the development and the agencies effecting it.

By the time of Nietzsche, the Darwinian theory of evolution and the origin of species had been formulated, and had become the centre of controversy. Its significance did not lie in its being the first to give expression to the idea of evolution, nor even the first to endeavour to explain evolution, but in its empirical character and its substantiation by a mass of verifiable facts. The theory started from the accepted fact of a tendency to vary in organisms, and argued that new species were only strongly marked and permanent varieties, naturally 'selected' or preserved on account of the favourable or useful character of the variations. Natural selection, which Darwin postulated on the analogy of human selection, almost unconsciously carried out, in the case of domesticated animals, is the preservation of those modifications which are favourable to the individual in its struggle for existence, and the rigid destruction of those individuals in which injurious variations occur. Without variation natural selection can do nothing; it merely preserves, and accumulates over a long period of time, differences of structure, the origin of which is unknown (Darwin suggested the influence of external factors upon the reproductive system), and thereby gradually produces an individual distinct from that from which it originally sprang, more improved in relation to its conditions of life, and more advanced in organization.

The central conception of Darwinism that it is external conditions which act as the pruning knife in organic development was opposed in Germany by a number of biologists,<sup>2</sup> following the footsteps of K. E. von Baer, who refused to accept the Darwinian theory. They rejected the doctrine that new species gradually arose from existing species by a process of modification and the influence of natural selection. The latter, as set forth by Darwin, was held to be inadequate: it threw everything upon the hypothesis of a struggle for existence. But, according to Darwin's opponents, a struggle for existence can never lead to development; it secures at most a merely stationary condition; and it is the exception, not the normal thing.

What was fundamental, for this school of biologists, was the assimilating and organizing power of the organism itself, somewhat analogous to will, which leads of its own expansive nature to growth and development. Variability, which Darwin made his starting-point and which he seemed to regard as something like a mere chance event, followed from the character of the organism which ever tends towards more complex organization. External conditions, like food and climate, produce of themselves only a temporary change—a change which remains only so long as its causes remain, and which is a change more in quantity than in quality. Species, however, differ qualitatively, and it is this qualitative difference which must be explained. The change, if it is to be of importance for development, must be permanent or remain after its cause is removed.

The principle of beneficial varieties and their natural selection, or the principle of the survival of the fittest, is rejected; but the theory yet does not ignore the presence of external factors. In the first place, the 'adaptation' of an organism to its environment is not due to natural selection, but is a consequent of the organizing power of

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<sup>2</sup> Representatives of these are Prof. C. V. Nägeli (1817–1891), professor at Munich; Professor Kölliker of Würzburg (1817–1905); Ludwig Rüttimeyer (1825–1895), Nietzsche's colleague at Bâle; W. H. Rolph, H. Hermann, Fr. von Göler-Ravensburg and others.

the organism which has led to that particular grade of organization and which enables the organism at that grade to react mostly in useful ways directly to stimuli. This organizing power manifests itself in the absorption of energy from the environment and in the assimilation of that energy so as to secure its maximum utilisation. It makes use of the available energy in gradually building up new substances which constitute the basis of new qualities or capabilities in addition to those which are inherited (for the rudimentary embryo contains all the properties of past generations), and, in thus making the organism more complex. Hence, the condition of development is not a struggle for existence but an abundance of nourishment. In the second place, however, these properties which are inherited lie latent in the organism, and their emergence into activity depends upon external conditions. The latter determine which tendencies shall become active.<sup>3</sup> Good nourishment, for example, can render tendencies active which might otherwise remain inactive. Through the influence of favourable external stimuli, or even through the rearrangement of tendencies among themselves, these latent properties can assume such an intensive character, or accumulated effects can gain so much in explosive power, that they pass over into a visible state. There thus emerges a new species or type according to a process of heterogeneous creation. It arises not as a result of a modification of an already existing species, but suddenly, in an unforeseen way, so that there is no continuity between species, and each species has its own conditions of existence.

It was in the midst of these evolutionary theories that Nietzsche's thought came to be finally shaped. Like most thinkers, since the evolutionary idea was clearly formulated, he could not escape its influence, and he sought in the facts

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Nietzsche's view of Napoleon, *Will to Power*: 1026. "He himself was corrupted through the means which he had to employ and lost fineness of character. With another type of man he could have successfully employed other means, and so it would not be necessary that a Caesar must become bad."

of evolution the means to a solution of his problem. Some writers, for example, Professor Simmel in *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche* and Prof. Alois Riehl in *Philosophie der Gegenwart* among others, have regarded Nietzsche as a Darwinian. Certain passages in Nietzsche seem at first sight to give ground for such a view. "To thwart fundamentally selection (Auswahl) in the species, its cleansing from degeneracy: that has been called hitherto virtue par excellence. Man should honour the fate which says to the weak 'perish'!"<sup>4</sup> Sympathy completely thwarts the law of development, which is the law of selection."<sup>5</sup> The question as to Nietzsche's view must not be begged by rendering the term 'selection' in these passages as 'natural selection.' Acceptance of selection as the law of development is not to be confused with the acceptance of 'natural selection,' which is a definite way in which selection is supposed to be effected. The biological view which Nietzsche adopts leads him to ask—particularly in the case of human life—not what agency effects selection but what counteracts it; and his doctrine of 'rearing' is intended to make the tendency, which is inherent in all life, effective also in human life through the removal of obstacles—such as mistaken standards of life and conduct—and provision of the necessary favourable conditions.

Nietzsche expressly opposes the Darwinian theory. He rejects environment as the supremely important factor in evolution, and insists upon the tremendous organizing power which can shape, create, and use environment. He regards adaptation as of purely secondary rank, as a consequent of the inner, spontaneous, assimilating power which is primary; he sees in organic life a tendency towards "life in its highest power"; he emphasizes the importance of the principle of economy in this connection; and the inner principle of life he calls a will to power. In this he is following the theory of Darwin's opponents, who held that in organic life there was an inherent tendency to

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<sup>4</sup> *Will to Power*: 54.

<sup>5</sup> *Der Antichrist*: 7.

develop and become more complex. Such development is towards richer and more complex forms, sharply differentiated and unique in quality. For Nietzsche, also, species which have abundant nourishment and are in general tended with supreme care soon manifest variation of the type in the strongest manner and are rich in wonders and monstrosities, while a species exposed to unfavourable conditions of a constant character remains rigid. A species, however, cannot evolve beyond a certain point; one species does not pass into another through modification; the changes, for example, in animals due to domestication are purely temporary and superficial; the type is not in the least altered. Each species has its limits; and where the limit is reached, it passes into a new species. In such a transition lies the goal of its development. In the process of development an explosive element is involved. This is specially seen in the case of genius. The concentration and synthesis of forces becomes so great that new modes and new conditions of life become imperative. The slightest chance incident serves to call forth the most significant results into the world and to change the course of the world's history.

In ranging himself on the side of this school of biology, Nietzsche is but following out a line of thought which is found in Schopenhauer, and which, indeed, may have given to Nietzsche's thought, through his early and deep study of Schopenhauer, its special direction. Schopenhauer's philosophy is, on the biological side, moulded by the theories of Lamarck, Agassiz and Chambers (the anonymous author of *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*). Rejecting their theological position, Schopenhauer accepts their doctrine of a gradual evolution of organic forms from the simplest to the highest, due to an inner impulse in organic life. He adopts the theory of heterogeneous creation; and the operative principle he calls will. There is a striving on the part of the will in each organism to attain the highest possible degree of objectification. There is an inner force struggling to unfold itself, Vol. XXVI.—No. 4.

seizing upon external material and assimilating it. Through this assimilation, the inner force becomes so intense that under favourable conditions a new type emerges, quite suddenly, quite unforeseen, and distinct from the parent of which it is the offspring. This is Schopenhauer's view of the origin of species; and it is on this basis that he formulates the doctrine of different grades of the will, which is simply the biological theory of varying grades of organization, blended with the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. Each grade, according to Schopenhauer, reveals more fully the potencies of the grade below it; the higher grade gathers up the properties scattered among various lower grades, and effects a new synthesis in such a way that the properties appear as an 'analogue' of their former self.

It is important to note, however, that two principles appear in Schopenhauer's theory: the 'will to become more' as seen in the above doctrine, and the 'will to live' which he elsewhere makes the basis of his teaching. "Everything pushes and strives for existence, where possible to organic form (that is, to life), and thereafter to the highest possible development of the same." The relative positions of the two principles remain obscure in Schopenhauer; but it is obvious that the struggle for existence presupposes a definite type of existence to be preserved; and the principle which operates in the origin of such types must be regarded as the more fundamental.

It is this principle—the will to become more—that Nietzsche adopts as the basis of his own theory, calling it a 'will to power.' The latter is to be regarded, first, as the inherent tendency of life to strive towards a higher and fuller life; secondly, as an effort on the part of every organism to secure those favourable conditions whereby its own existence is maintained and improved, and whereby the ascent to higher types is effected. Nietzsche may thus be regarded as developing that aspect of Schopenhauer in which the latter's most positive significance is to be found. In him, this positive element in the form of an effort after a richer and fuller existence becomes very prominent. His

theory emphasises that this is essentially the nature of will. The development of psychology by his time rendered it possible for him to avoid the confusion regarding the nature of the will into which Schopenhauer fell. He refuses to divorce will from its content, from its 'whither.' There is for him no such thing as a will devoid of, or subtracted from, its end: such a will is a mere abstract generalisation.

### III.

Nietzsche, in turning to the phenomena of organic life to find an objective solution to his problem, instead of taking his stand upon an inner fact of consciousness such as an 'ought' or a categorical imperative and instead of elaborating an *a priori* standard according to which men must conform in their conduct, adopts an empirical attitude. He simply says that wherever he looks in nature and in human life, even in those spheres where at first sight such a thing would be least expected, as in the church, Christianity, and asceticism, he sees the operation of a will to power. "Wherever I found life, there found I the will to power; and even in the will of the servant found I the will to be master." "And where there are sacrifice, service and love, there also is the will to be master." Taking this will to power as an empirical fact, Nietzsche seeks to reinterpret human action in the light of it. Human action is accepted by him as a phenomenon which, as such, is unquestionable, but which may be variously interpreted; and he endeavours to give a new interpretation of the springs of action as against other interpretations, particularly that of Schopenhauer. The significance of his criticism of pity, for example, lies, not in any objection he has to the giving of help to the unfortunate, but in its being directed against the view that the principle of an act of pity should be disinterestedness, disregard of one's own personality, based upon an abstract equality of one personality to another.

From his empirical standpoint Nietzsche regards the individual as the most real thing; and the individual is the conscious, human organism. It is impossible to eliminate the individual as Schopenhauer does in his principle of disinterestedness. "Nothing," he says in the *Antichrist* (aphorism 11), "causes deeper ruin than the impersonal duty, every sacrifice to the Moloch of abstraction." The species, to which Schopenhauer subjected the individual and to the supremacy of which he saw testimony in the intensity of the sex-impulse, is an abstraction. The intensity of the sex-impulse is, according to Nietzsche, rooted in the nature of the individual, not the species. And, again, what has been called the state is completely misunderstood. The worship bestowed upon the state arises from transferring to it the glory which is fundamentally due to the achievements of creative individuals. The state is properly only a means to the preservation of these achievements, which have a significance more lasting than the life of such individuals. It creates nothing; but it gathers up and consolidates tradition; and it thereby gains a mistaken worship. The result of this is that the state, living upon the past, tends to crush individuality, which is, for Nietzsche, always the point of growth. The state thus tends to favour mediocrity as against originality; it limits the individual, and destroys the sense of self-responsibility and the consciousness of values higher than those embodied in the state.

From biology, again, Nietzsche obtains the conception of an order of rank. The latter is an application of the biological theory of different grades of organization, and of Schopenhauer's doctrine of the various grades of objectified will, to human life. The differences between men are to be taken as something real (as against Schopenhauer's abstract view of identity of all men and even animals) and as sufficient to constitute different types.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. *David Strauss, der Bekenner u. der Schriftsteller*: 7. "All moral conduct, says Strauss, is a self-determination of the individual according to the idea of the species. This imperative is unfortunately utterly impracticable and



There are higher and lower individuals. Each type of man, after the manner of biological species, has his own conditions of existence; only, in the case of man, these conditions appear as values. Each type of man has, in consequence, his own system of moral values. "Morality is a system of valuations which are bound up with the conditions of a creature's existence." This is the basis of Nietzsche's theory of the relativity of moral values and of his refutation of Schopenhauer's principle of sympathy. It is on this ground, too, that he emphasizes the felt need of maintaining the sense of proportion between the small and the great, and of leavening the prevailing mass of uniform mediocrity by means of strong contrasts.

It has to be noted, however, that biology itself provides for Nietzsche a safeguard against the possible danger of an extreme individualism which might seem to be contained in his emphasis upon the individual. The individual is not viewed as an atomic unit, as he tends to be under the influence of a mechanical view. The atomic individual Nietzsche holds to be a mere illusion; the real individual concentrates in himself all the results of ancestral experiences. It is due to the concentration of forces that new and higher types emerge. The goal of one type is reached when he passes into a higher type. Hence, Nietzsche is continually repeating the cry that man is something that must be surpassed and that man is merely a bridge to an ever higher type.

The ideal which dominates Nietzsche's thought, and which is obtained from biology and from Schopenhauer, is that of the 'synthetic' man. A movement is necessary, he says, for the "creation of the synthetic man." "The great synthetic man is lacking, in whom the different forces for attaining the one goal are correctly harnessed together. What we have is the multifarious man, the most interesting

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pointless, because under the concept man the most diverse elements are bound together, *e. g.*, the Patagonians and Master Strauss, and because nobody would dare to say with equal right: live as a Patagonian, and live as Master Strauss."

chaos, that there has probably hitherto been." This ideal is not a species produced by what Darwin calls natural selection, nor is he the successful individual who wins his way to the top in the struggle for mastery and holds his position through brute force. It is the idea of organization or synthesis that is dominant with Nietzsche. Progress towards a higher type involves a synthesis of the qualities which are spread over a number of inferior types. "The majority of people are only piecemeal and fragmentary examples of man: only when all those pieces are reckoned up, does a man become known. Whole ages and whole peoples, in this sense, have a fragmentary character. . . . The only important consideration is the rise of the synthetic man; inferior men and by far the great majority of people are but rehearsals and exercises out of which here and there a whole man may arise." Each later stage gathers up and assimilates the preceding stages. The element of seeming brutality in Nietzsche's theory admits of quite another interpretation in the light of this ideal. When he says that we should "honour the fate which says to the weak 'perish!'" he means that, if selection is properly effected for purposes of development, weaker types would cease to be born and be replaced by higher types. When he says that "the amount of progress is in fact even measured by the mass of all that had to be sacrificed in order to bring it about: mankind en masse sacrificed in order to secure the growth of a single stronger new species of man—that would be progress," he means that the higher in the scale a type is, the fewer are its members, but the quality far outweighs the loss in numbers. The superman organizes in one person all the tendencies and features of numerous other individuals so as to reveal, through the new balancing of forces thus effected, new aspects or possibilities of these tendencies and forces. Even those features which mark the criminal can be so assimilated by the strong individual as then to appear in an analogous form but now made contributory to a higher and fuller level of life. The superman develops in himself

a wealth of antagonistic elements, but he is capable of balancing them finely in relation to each other.

The rise of such a synthetic type is to be secured through a special process of rearing. This process is, in the first place, rendered possible by the rejection of that pessimism which is involved in the view that values are fixed and imperishable and must simply be accepted by man, and by the acceptance of that optimism, based on biology, which sees that all creative power resides in the individual and that values are created by man himself. The environment can be moulded so as to be made subservient to the emergence of higher types. For this latter aim there must be careful husbanding of human resources over successive generations, hard discipline and healthy living on the part of the members of each generation, and the establishment of those favourable conditions under which individuality may have scope to manifest itself, and genius may both be created and, where present, be allowed to emerge. But, in any case, the great abilities of the individual stand out of all proportion to what he himself has done, sacrificed, and suffered; for what he is, his forefathers have paid the price in struggling, labouring and persevering. This steady effort in overcoming hostile circumstances is a prime condition for the appearance of a higher type. And to supply the motive power to the individual to give his active co-operation in this process of organic development Nietzsche formulates the doctrine of the 'eternal cycle,' which he in no way pretends to have any more ultimate validity than that of a useful myth.

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